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Researching the Hearsay Rule:
Emerging Findings, General Issues,
and Future Directions
Richard F. Rakos* and Stephan Landsman**
I. THE HEARSAY RULE AS A FOCUS OF EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATION
In recent years, scholars applying social science to the law
have sought to test a wide array of legal assumptions empirically. Researchers working on evidentiary issues have provided
data about the use of prior convictions,' coerced confessions,2
eyewitness identifications,3 expert testimony, 4 post-hypnotic
* Professor, Department of Psychology, Cleveland State University.
B.A- 1972, State University of New York at Stony Brook; M.A. 1976, Ph.D.
1978, Kent State University.
** Professor of Law, Cleveland Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University. B.A. 1969, Kenyon College; J.D. 1972, Harvard University.
The order in which the authors' names are listed is the result of an agreement growing out of previous coauthorships, and should not be taken as an indication of relative contributions to this article. The authors thank William
Danko, Administrator of the Cuyahoga County (Ohio) Court of Common
Pleas, Brenda Johnson and Maureen Klemens for their research assistance in
the preparation of this Article, and Professor Michael Saks for his comments
and advice.
1. See W.R. Cornish & A.P. Sealy, Juriesand the Rules of Evidence, 1973
Cums. L. REv. 208; Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberationsof Simulated Juries,18 CRIM. L.Q. 235
(1976); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefjicacy of Limiting
Instructions: Wen Jurors Use PriorConviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt,
9 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 37 (1985).
2. See Saul M. Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogationsand Confessions: CommunicatingPromises and Threats by PragmaticImplication, 15
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 233 (1991); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman,
Confession Evidence, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 67 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Coerced Confessions, Judicial Instructions,
and Mock Juror Verdicts, 11 J. APPLiED Soc. PSYCHOL. 489 (1981); Saul M.
Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, PriorConfession and Mock Jury Verdicts,
10 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 133 (1980).
3. For a recent summary of this large body of research, see LAWRENCE S.
WRIGm'sMAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 137 (2d ed. 1991).
4. See Gary L. Wells, Expert Psychological Testimony: Empirical and
Conceptual Analyses of Effects, 10 LAw & HuM. BEHAv. 83 (1986).
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The hearsay

rule has been notably absent from the list of topics studied.
This exclusion is particularly striking in light of John Henry
Wigmore's assertion that hearsay is the "most characteristic
rule of the Anglo-American law of evidence." 7 Why has the
hearsay rule been ignored as a subject of investigation?
One possibility is that the absence of hearsay research is
simply a function of the limitations of an emerging discipline.
Another possible explanation is a lack of legal sophistication
among researchers. However, one of the major justifications
for the hearsay rule-that hearsay compromises the fairness of
a trial-suggests a third possibility. In a recent article in Law
and Human Behavior, Gary Melton suggested that the socialscience-in-law movement is scientifically conservative but politically liberal.8 Unlike the evidentiary rules that experimenters
have investigated, the hearsay rule appears to protect a defendant from the power of the state. Therefore, critical examination of the rule may have seemed less attractive to social
scientists.9 Hesitating on this basis to scrutinize hearsay is unwarranted, both because its impact on the fairness of a trial is
amenable to empirical evaluation and becatuse the rule may on
occasion work to the detriment of criminal defendants, as, for
example, when it bars exculpatory hearsay from admission at
trial.1o

The first results of empirical research on the effect of hearsay evidence on jurors' verdicts were presented by two independent research groups at the 1990 meeting of the
American Psychological Association. Using undergraduate subjects and videotape trial reenactments, a group including
5. See Edith Greene et al., Impact of Hypnotic Testimony on the Jury, 13
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 61 (1989).
6. See Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, The Effects of Impeachment Evidence and Limiting Instructions on Individual and Group Decision Making,
12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 477 (1988); Wissler & Saks, supra note 1.
7. 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 1364, at
28 (John H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
8. Gary B. Melton, Law, Science, and Humanity: The Normative Foun-

dation of Social Science in Law, 14 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 315, 321 (1990).
9. Another possible reason, recently suggested by Richard Lempert, is
that there is no central, organizing, psychological theory in the hearsay area of
the sort to be found in the case of such carefully examined subjects as eyewitness testimony. Richard 0. Lempert, Presentation at the Hearsay Reform
Conference (Sept. 7, 1991). A substantial body of social science research has
been done, however, in a number of areas where no such principle appears to
exist. See, e.g., materials cited supra note 1.

10. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298-303 (1973).
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Meine, Park, Borgida, and Anderson assessed juror evaluative
competence by comparing four evidentiary conditions: one involving only circumstantial evidence; a second involving circumstantial evidence and eyewitness testimony; a third
involving circumstantial evidence and hearsay; and a fourth involving circumstantial evidence, eyewitness testimony, and
hearsay." These researchers found that the combination of inculpatory hearsay testimony and circumstantial evidence resulted in only a few more guilty verdicts than when the jurors
considered the circumstantial evidence by itself. Moreover, the
jurors who considered the hearsay testimony and the circumstantial evidence gave substantially fewer guilty verdicts than
those who were also presented with eyewitness testimony. In
fact, the mock jurors appeared to discount the hearsay testimony; the conviction rate actually went down when eyewitness
testimony was coupled with hearsay. The mock jurors judged
the hearsay testimony to be less important and less reliable
than eyewitness evidence, suggesting that jurors may adequately weigh and evaluate some types of hearsay.
The authors of this Article conducted the second study, in
which undergraduates read twelve-page hypothetical criminal
transcripts that contained either weak, moderate, or strong
prosecution evidence. In addition, the transcripts offered either
no hearsay or hearsay that was strong, moderate, or weak in its
inculpatory implications. The hearsay was admitted without attorney objection or judicial limiting instruction. The results
suggested that jurors do indeed note the presence of strong and
moderate hearsay. Subjects who reported a higher reliance on
hearsay in forming judgments about people in daily life
ascribed greater importance to the hearsay information
presented at trial. Despite this, guilty verdicts did not vary as a
function of hearsay testimony. Rather, the overall strength of
the case determined verdicts. Thus, hearsay that was not highlighted as inappropriate, and that was introduced within the
context of a substantial amount of other evidence, appeared to
influence the ultimate outcome of the trial only minimally.12
Recently, Regina Schuller reported a third study in a paper
11. Peter Miene et al., The Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, Presented at
the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, Boston, Mass.
(Aug. 1990) in CURRENT IssuEs IN INDIvDuAL AND GROUP DECISION-MAEING
RESEARCH (A. John Castellan ed., forthcoming 1992).
12. Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary EmpiricalEnquiry Concerning the Prohibitionof Hearsay Evidence in
American Courts, 15 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 65, 76 (1991).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:655

presented at the June, 1991, meeting of the Law and Society
Association.' 3 She had undergraduates from psychology classes
read a summary of a criminal trial transcript based on an actual
case. The transcript included exculpatory hearsay from an expert witness describing certain facts and the defendant's state
of mind at the time of the crime. As in the case of the studies
on inculpatory hearsay, Schuller found that exculpatory hearsay did not affect the verdicts of mock jurors, despite clear data
indicating that the mock jurors noted and processed the hearsay material.
II.

THE PRESENT STUDY

The consistency of the findings of the three initial and independent exploratory studies on hearsay is provocative. Science, however, demands a wide convergence of data from
different sources before a finding is accepted as a reflection of
reality.' 4 Additionally, the legal community insists on experimentation that evaluates the circumstances that exist in actual
courtroom settings before it will even consider modifications
based on empirical studies.15 Therefore, much additional work
remains to be done before the findings of these studies can be
useful to either scholarly community. In recognition of this requirement, we have conducted a second hearsay study and intend to mount a series of increasingly sophisticated and refined
investigations of the topic in the future.
A major criticism of many past empirical studies of legal
processes has centered on their use of college undergraduates
as subjects.' 6 A number of scholars have raised objections to
generalizations based upon findings obtained from subjects who
13. Regina A. Schuller, Expert Evidence and Hearsay Evidence: The Influence of "Second Hand" Information on Jurors' Decisions (June 25, 1991)
(paper presented at the annual Law and Society Association meeting, on file
with the Minnesota Law Review).
14. See RICHARD A. LIPPA, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 43

(1990).
15.

See WALLACE D. LOH, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 4

(1984); Charles R. Tremper, Sanguinity and Disillusionment Where Law
Meets Social Science, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 267, 270 (1987). Courts at times,
however, will rely on the weakest sort of social science materials to bolster
their arguments. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (allowing juries of less than 12 in a criminal case).

16. See LOH, supra note 15, at 460; Brian L. Cutler, Juror Sensitivity to
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 185, 186 (1990);
Wayne Weiten & Shari S. Diamond, A CriticalReview of the Jury Simulation
Paradigm: The Case of Defendant Characteristics,3 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 71,
76 (1979).
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may be different from actual jurors in important ways.1 7 Consequently, in our second study we employed a hypothetical
criminal trial transcript, similar to that used in our first experiment, but assessed the reactions of actual members of the
Cuyahoga County (Ohio) Common Pleas Court jury pool. We
invited people waiting to be called for voir dire to participate; a
read the trantotal of 142 males and females volunteered to
8
script and complete the three questionnaires.'
We subjected the trial transcript to extensive pilot testing
with this population in an effort to create a balanced vehicle
that would allow inculpatory hearsay testimony to influence
the outcome. Eventually, we achieved a situation where verdicts were evenly split between guilty and not guilty. We then
used this transcript to develop seven conditions that varied the
nature of the eyewitness identification of a perpetrator alleged
to have stolen a coat from a restaurant coat rack. The seven
conditions were:
1) No eyewitness identification: Bystander waitress said:
"I was very busy and didn't see anything."
2) Vague eyewitness identification: Bystander waitress
said: "I thought I saw someone in a flowered shirt look at some
coats."
3) Vague hearsay testimony: Bystander waitress said another waitress told her that "she thought she saw someone in a
flowered shirt look at some coats."
4) Vague hearsay testimony with counsel objection and
judicialinstruction to disregard.
5) Specific eyewitness identification: Bystander waitress
said: "A man with a flowered shirt, whom I now recognize as
the defendant, carefully checked the pockets of eight to ten
raincoats. From the last he pulled a wallet, looked around nervously, put the coat on, and ran out."
6) Specific hearsay testimony: Bystander waitress said
another waitress told her that "she had seen a man with a flowered shirt, whom she later recognized as the defendant, carefully check the pockets of eight to ten raincoats, pull a wallet
17. See Vladimir Kone~ni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, External Validity of Research in Legal Psychology, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 46 (1979); David 0.
Sears, College Sophomores in the Laboratory: Influences of a Narrow Data
Base on Social Psychology's View of Human Nature, 51 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 515, 527 (1986); Weiten & Diamond, supra note 16, at 76. But
see Cutler, supra note 16, at 186.
18. The original sample included 175 members of the jury pool. Before
completing the materials, 33 subjects were called for voir dire.
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from the last one, look around nervously, put the coat on and
run out of the restaurant."
7) Specific hearsay testimony with counsel objection and
judicialinstruction to disregard.
The transcripts for the seven conditions were identical in
all other respects except that the two eyewitness conditions
presented four witnesses for the prosecution, while the four
hearsay conditions and the no eyewitness identification condition presented three prosecution witnesses. The extra witness
in the two eyewitness conditions was, of course, the waitress
whose words otherwise were turned into hearsay and quoted by
a co-worker. All conditions included identical introductory remarks by the judge, opening and closing statements by counsel,
several dozen evidentiary statements by the witnesses, cross-examination, and final instructions detailing the applicable Ohio
law and the jury's duty to apply the law to the facts.
We escorted subjects in groups to the room used to sequester juries and instructed them to read the transcript carefully,
assume the role of jurors who would return a verdict, and then
respond to three short questionnaires in the following order:
* Trial Decision Questionnaire: verdict (guilty/not
guilty) and confidence in verdict rated on a seven-point scale.
* Trial Reaction Questionnaire: one item assessing defendant's character; thirteen items assessing the importance
ascribed to specific evidentiary statements in the order they
were introduced at the trial, including the variable eyewitness/hearsay statement; and five items concerning the integrity
of the trial, including fairness of the trial and the judge, competence of each attorney, and extent of justice achieved. All were
to be rated on seven-point scales.
* Sources of PersonalJudgment Scale: seven items rated
on a seven-point scale assessing the importance attached to specific sources of information when forming judgments about
others. Sources included first-hand information acquired
through actual interactions, second-hand information involving
what others said had been their experience with another person and what others said they had heard about another person,
and four social/cultural sources included as "fillers" such as
newspaper advice columns, television documentaries, and films.
One-way analyses of variance revealed no significant differences among the seven conditions for any item on the Sources
of Personal Judgment Scale. Thus, across the seven conditions,
subjects reported similar use in everyday life of hearsay and di-
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rect experience. Looking at the overall means, all subjects reported direct experience to be more important than either what
others said had been their experience with another person or
what they heard about another person.'9
We analyzed guilty and not guilty verdicts by a chi-square.
This revealed no significant differences in the frequencies of
verdicts among mock jurors reading the seven different transcripts. 20 Of interest, however, is the fact that only twentyseven percent of the jurors presented with specific hearsay testimony returned guilty verdicts, whereas fifty-two percent of
the jurors receiving specific hearsay testimony with a limiting
instruction returned a guilty verdict. The difference suggests
the possibility of a boomerang effect, i.e., that the limiting instruction 1caused jurors to emphasize, rather than disregard, the
2
hearsay.
We also performed one-way analyses of variance on the
mock jurors' confidence in their verdicts, their assessment of
the character of the defendant, the importance they ascribed to
thirteen specific evidentiary statements, and their evaluation of
the five items concerning the integrity of the trial. The only
significant difference resulted from the importance the groups
attributed to the eyewitness/hearsay testimony.22 Further
analysis of this finding,as summarized in Table 2,24 revealed
19.

With 0 = least important and 6 = most important, the means were 5.3

(direct experience), 2.8 (what others said had been their experience with another person), and 1.6 (what was heard about another person). These means
are virtually identical to those reported by the undergraduate subjects in our
previous study, suggesting that the two populations share important characteristics. See Landsman & Rakos, supra note 12, at 82.
20.
Table 1
Mock Juror Verdicts As a Function of Condition
Condition

Guilty

Not Guilty

1.
No Eyewitness ID
9
10
2.
Vague Eyewitness ID
8
15
3.
Vague Hearsay ID
6
7
4.
Vague Hearsay + Instruction
9
10
5.
Specific Eyewitness ID
11
12
6.
Specific Hearsay ID
6
16
7.
Specific Hearsay + Instruction
12
11
Chi-Square: Not Significant
21. See, e.g., Sharon Wolf & David A. Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level of JudicialAdmonishment to Disregardon the Judgments of Mock Jurors,7 J. APPLiED SOC. PSYCHOL. 205, 207 (1977).
22. F (6, 134) = 9.96, p < .0001.
23. Tukey B post-hoc comparisons.
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that mock jurors judged the specific eyewitness testimony to be
significantly more important than the testimony in any other
condition except specific hearsay. 25 Furthermore, the jurors
judged specific hearsay testimony to be significantly more important than the testimony in all other conditions except the
specific eyewitness and the vague hearsay conditions. 26 Of additional interest was the mock jurors' report that they disregarded hearsay evidence in the specific hearsay with limiting
instructions condition, as indicated by the exceedingly low importance attached to the specific hearsay when an instruction
was given.2 Nevertheless, as noted earlier, mock jurors in this
condition were somewhat more likely to find the defendant

guilty.
Our interpretation of these data is highly tentative. On the
one hand, the introduction of specific, presumably damaging,
hearsay testimony that was clearly processed by subjects did
not increase guilty verdicts. On the other hand, the same can
be said for specific, damaging, admissible eyewitness testimony.
At least two explanations for these findings are plausible.
First, our methodology may have been weak. This is a possibility because a number of studies indicate that eyewitness identification is a powerful-perhaps the most powerful-type of
evidence, despite its unreliability.28
Alternatively, we may
have been examining a weak phenomenon, in which case no
single piece of evidence could, by itself, significantly affect the
24.
Table 2

Importance of Eyewitness/Hearsay Identification
Testimony
Condition
Specific Hearsay + Instruction
Vague Hearsay + Instruction
No Eyewitness ID
Vague Eyewitness ID
Vague Hearsay ID

25.

0.878
1.58'
1.79'
2.13' b
2.50

Specific Hearsay ID
3.59b c
Specific Eyewitness ID
4.43'
*
Scale: 0 = least important, 6 = most
important.
Means sharing the same superscript do not
differ significantly from each other at p < .05
(Tukey B test).
Mean 4.43; see supra note 24 (Table 2).

26. Mean 3.59; see supra note 24 (Table 2).
27.
28.

Mean*

Mean 0.87; see supra note 24 (Table 2).
See WRiGHTSMAN, supra note 3, at 145.
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verdict, at least under most circumstances. Support for this hy-

pothesis is provided by research that suggests that jurors construct a "story" as a trial unfolds and thereby incorporate and
interpret new testimony within the context of previous testimony and the story line as a whole.An analysis of the importance the mock jurors ascribed to
the thirteen pieces of evidentiary testimony assessed in the
Trial Reaction Questionnaire further supports the weak phenomenon possibility. Reactions to twelve of these pieces of evidence were constant across all seven conditions, as predicted.
The only one to which reactions differed was the variable eyewitness/hearsay testimony. From Table 3,30 it is clear that jurors viewed the specific eyewitness testimony as no more
important, and perhaps less important, than most of the other
evidence. This is particularly true for evidence presented
before the eyewitness testimony. These data suggest that eyewitness testimony may be less critical to juror decision making
than previously thought l or that the order of the "story" is de29. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 242, 243 (1986).
30.
Table 3
Importance of Evidentiary Statements
Statement Mean*

1. Victim described wallet

4.4

2.
3.
4.

4.7
5.3
5.0

10.

Victim noticed missing coat
Victim described distinctive features of coat
Victim and others noticed numerous coats on
rack
Arresting officer found defendant wearing coat
Arresting officer encountered no resistance
Arresting officer found wallet in defendant's
pants pocket
Waitress recalled noticing defendant looking
over coat rack
Specific eyewitness condition: Waitress
described defendant's actions when taking
coat
Specific hearsay condition: Waitress described
another waitress's observations of
defendant's actions when taking coat
Waitress checked for defendant's coat at end

11.

of day
Defendant could not find his coat

5.
6.
7.
8.
9a.
9b.

12.
13.

Defendant placed strange wallet in pants
pocket for safekeeping
Defendant failed to notice wrong coat
Scale: 0 = unimportant, 6 = very important

*

31.

See materials summarized in WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 3.

5.4
5.0
5.4
4.4
4.4
3.6
3.5

3.6
4.8
4.3
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terminative, or both. Further, since jurors judged the specific
hearsay testimony to be somewhat less important than the specific eyewitness testimony, these data strongly suggest that the
mere introduction of hearsay testimony may not disproportionately influence juror decisions.
At this point, neither our research nor the initial work of
other investigators substantiates the hypothesized dangers of
hearsay testimony. In fact, the clear consistency in the findings
of independent researchers employing different methodologies
is provocative. Mock jurors do not appear to be unduly swayed
by such evidence, nor do they appear to perceive that it affects
the integrity of the trial process. Thus, jurors may be competent to weigh hearsay testimony appropriately and resist the inclination to see it as an automatic blot on the fairness of
proceedings. Nonetheless, a host of questions and issues remain
to be investigated.
III. THE FUTURE OF EMPIRICAL INQUIRY
CONCERNING HEARSAY
If we truly wish to understand the purpose and operation
of the hearsay rule, or any other evidence rule for that matter,
we must commit ourselves to a project of longer duration and
broader scope than has previously been undertaken. Such a
study of the hearsay rule may both inform us about hearsay
and establish a useful methodology for examining other evidentiary rules.
Three critical and interrelated issues must be addressed as
hearsay research moves forward. First, we must determine the
real nature and functions of the hearsay rule as a legal mechanism. Second, we must determine when, in the course of the
research, sufficient data have been accumulated to warrant advocacy of reform. Finally, we must consider whether the risks
attendant to reform have been adequately explored. Only then
should we be willing to embrace definitive changes.
A.

THE LEGAL NATURE AND FUNCTION OF HEARSAY

A clear understanding of the functioning and objectives of
a procedural rule is critical to successful social science analysis. 32 Only when such an understanding exists can empirical
tests be properly designed to ascertain whether the rule's un32. See Paul Lermack, No Right Number? Social Science Research and
the Jury-Size Cases, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 951, 974 (1979) (expressing pessimism
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derlying assumptions are sound and its goals effectively served.
Unfortunately, this is not an easy task. The three obvious
sources of guidance are the text of the rule, scholarly interpretation of that text, and practice in the courtroom. All too frequently these sources present strikingly inconsistent insights
vis-a-vis each other and within themselves.
Today there is a lively scholarly debate about the meaning
and function of the hearsay rule. Some writers have emphasized its importance in guaranteeing the reality and appearance
of procedural fairness by requiring in-court confrontations.33
Others have presented it as a means of guarding judgments
from subsequent attack.34 Still others have stressed the rule's
role in maintaining the adversarial nature of judicial proceedings.35 These theories notwithstanding, a number of observers
have pointed out that in modern American courts the hearsay
rule is mostly honored in the breach and that little "important"
hearsay is excluded from consideration. 36 While it will be of
substantial importance in the long-term study of hearsay to sort
out precisely why and when we use the rule, for the purposes
of beginning our research, a less complete analysis will suffice.
The following is a thumbnail sketch of the history of the
use of the hearsay rule. It is included to suggest that the rule is
a complex legal creation with a range of not entirely consistent
objectives. The research described in the first part of this paper
focused on only one of the issues addressed by the rule-juror
incompetence. Even a cursory examination of the history of
hearsay makes it clear that exploration of the incompetence
question will not suffice as a measure of the rule's operation or
importance. Other questions must be considered to ensure a
thorough empirical examination. These include questions
about the appearance of fairness and the value of crossexamination.
The hearsay rule was not the creation of some clever legal
about the ability of social scientists to examine effectively any but the narrowest legal questions).
33. E.g., Eleanor Swift, A FoundationFact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 1339, 1369-75 (1987).
34. E.g., Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On JudicialProof
and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1372-75 (1985).
35. E.g., 5 WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1364, at 20-28; Edmund M. Morgan,
Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REv. 177, 181-84 (1948); Swift,
supra note 33, at 1369-76.
36. See Jack B. Weinstein, ProbativeForce of Hearsay, 46 IOwA L. REv.
331, 346 (1961). But see Eleanor Swift, The HearsayRule at Work Has It Been
Abolished De Facto by JudicialDecision?,76 MINN. L. REv. 473 (1992).
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philosopher or rules-drafting committee. Rather, it was a byproduct of jury-based common law adjudication. It was molded
and remolded over the course of more than four centuries by
lawyers pursuing the business of representing clients and by
judges seeking to ensure proper verdicts. As a consequence of
its incremental development, the rule, like so much in AngloAmerican jurisprudence, does not have a single goal or express
a single viewpoint. It reflects a variety of objectives sought at
different times by participants in the courtroom contest.
Medieval English jury adjudication was, in essence, based
upon hearsay. Juries in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries decided cases on the basis of the rumor, gossip, and community opinion to which they were exposed before the trial
commenced.3 7 While reservations about hearsay were articulated as early as 1202,38 it was not until the latter half of the
1500s that serious concerns were voiced about its use in
litigation.
Dubious second-hand evidence was used in attempts to convict two popular political figures, Sir Nicholas Throckmorton in
155439 and Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603. 40 Both defendants decried the unfairness of this tactic, 41 as did commentators who
later discussed their trials. Sir Walter Raleigh's execution, on
the basis of hearsay statements from two men, at least one of
whom the government had in its power and refused to produce
at trial, became a rallying point for sentiment against the use of
hearsay evidence. During the turbulent half century from the
rise of Cromwell to the Glorious Revolution, use of the hearsay
doctrine grew,4 as the rule came to be viewed as one means of
blunting the prosecutorial zeal of rulers bent on dominating
wealthy and powerful members of the aristocracy. In this setting, the hearsay proscription served as a means of enhancing
37. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 624 (2d ed. 1968). Juries in
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries heard few, if any, witnesses. See
THoMAs A. GREEN, VERDIcr ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 16-17 (1985).
38. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 37, at 622.

39. See Throckmorton's Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 215 (K.B. 1554).
40. See Regina v. Raleigh, 2 State Tr. 1 (1603).
41. Raleigh is said to have complained, "[i]f witnesses are to speak by relation of one another, by this means you may have any man's life in a week; and
I may be massacred by mere hearsay as Sir Nicholas Throckmorton was like to
have been in Queen Mary's time." 9 WILLIAM HOLDsWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 445 (3d ed. 1944).
42. See John H. Wigmore, The History of the HearsayRule, 17 HARV. L.
REV. 437, 445 (1904).
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the integrity of the judicial process, at least in the case of those
of means and social prominence.
Despite these developments, hearsay was not a widely utilized concept in the early 1700s. The proceedings of London's
central criminal court, the Old Bailey, reveal that the hearsay
rule was virtually never invoked before the 1730s. 43 Prosecutors and prisoners alike employed out-of-court words. In the
1730s, this began to change. The central objective of the new
approach seemed to be to ensure that courts and juries were
provided, whenever possible, with first-hand sworn testimony
subject to cross-examination. During the course of the eighteenth century, this principle, particularly with regard to crossexamination, grew substantially."
Hearsay was dramatically reconceptualized in the nineteenth century. From as early as the time of Lord Mansfield,
judges and treatise writers began to emphasize the incompetence of jurors as a justification for the hearsay prohibition.
This new argument was strikingly different from arguments
based on procedural fairness or the production of witnesses for
cross-examination. As the 1800s wore on, lawyers increasingly
argued that the untutored members of the jury were incompetent to assess the value of second-hand information. As the influential treatise writer Thomas Starkie put it:
If it were to be assumed, that one who had been long enured to judicial habits might be able to assign to such evidence just so much, and
no greater credit than it deserved, yet, upon the minds of a jury unskilled in the nature of judicial proofs, evidence of this kind would
frequently make an erroneous impression. 45

As a result of such views, limitations on the use of hearsay increased. However, these limits were likely to be ignored when
judges concluded that a particular type of hearsay was safe for
jurors to consider. This approach produced a complex rule with
a range of exceptions.
Around the beginning of the present century, the two giants of American evidence law, James Bradley Thayer and
John Henry Wigmore, turned their attention to the hearsay
rule. Both embraced variants of the juror incompetence hypothesis in conjunction with the cross-examination and fairness
43. See Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the ContentiousSpirit. Adversary
Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 497, 564-72
(1990).
44. Id. at 539-42, 548-64.
45. 1 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

45 (1824).
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principles. 46 This meant the perpetuation of a chimerical hearsay rule utilizing a rigid exclusionary scheme with respect to
some categories of material. Although generations of reformers
have tried to slay this monster, the rule remains an amalgam of
concerns about juror competence, cross-examination, and fairness. Researchers must keep this multiplicity of objectives in
mind as they pursue further empirical research.
B.

WHEN HAVE SUFFICIENT DATA BEEN GATHERED TO
WARRANT CONSIDERATION OF REFORM?

Social scientists who examine legal procedures face particularly tough questions when deciding whether their findings
warrant a call for reform. Lawyers have been deeply skeptical
of such calls, often with good reason.47 The dispute that arose
in 1908 after the publication of Professor Hugo Muensterberg's
On the Witness Stand presents a fine example of the sort of reception social science reformers have received. In his book,
Muensterberg argued:
Yes, it can be said that, while the court makes the fullest use of all
the modern scientific methods when, for instance, a drop of dried
blood is to be examined in a murder case, the same court is completely satisfied with the most unscientific and haphazard methods of
common prejudice and ignorance when a mental product, especially
the memory report of a witness, is to be examined. No juryman
would be expected to follow his general impressions in the question as
to whether the blood on the murderer's shirt is human or animal.
But he is expected to make up his mind as to whether the memory
ideas of a witness are objective reproductions of earlier experience or
are mixed up with associations and suggestions. The court proceeds as
if the physiological chemistry of blood examination had made wonderful progress, while experimental psychology, with its efforts to analyze the mental faculties, still stood where it stood two thousand years
48
ago.
46. See JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT
COMMON LAw 47, 518-23 (1898); Edmund M. Morgan & John M. Maguire,
Looking Backward and Forwardat Evidence, 50 HARv. L. REV. 909, 919 (1937)
("Mr. Wigmore's basic assumption in treating hearsay [was] a judicial conviction that the jury must be protected from testimony which it [could not] properly evaluate.").
47. On the other hand, some lawyers and judges have too frequently been
eager consumers of dubious data and conclusions based upon them. An example of this inclination was Wigmore's virtually blind willingness to accept the
allegedly scientific claims of handwriting "experts" like Albert Osborn. See D.
Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignoranceas a Proxy for RationalKnowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise", 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 731, 764-71 (1989).
48. HuGO MUENSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND 44-45 (1908).
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The professor then claimed that psychology had developed
several mechanisms appropriate for immediate judicial adoption. Among these were a method for assessing testimonial
certitude by examining various witness reactions 49 and a
means of appraising a defendant's guilt through associational
techniques, °
Wigmore unmercifully attacked Muensterberg's proposals.
He challenged each in the context of six questions: "(1) Does it
offer something new? (2) Are its rules exact? (3) Are its tests
concrete, not merely abstract? (4) Are the conditions of its use
practical? (5) Are its results yet even agreed upon? (6) Has it
yet taken all available means of verifying its relative efficiency?"'5 1 Wigmore's first three questions focused on the
translation of allegedly new psychological insights to the courtroom. Wigmore argued that many of Muensterberg's ideas
were not novel. He demonstrated that judges and legal scholars had been aware of and had taken into account the sorts of
phenomena Muensterberg mentioned long before the professor
wrote his book. 52 Wigmore next argued that the psychological
data in question were far from exact and were couched in
terms that could provide no clear, let alone definitive, answers
to questions from the courtroom. 53 He then demonstrated that
the general principles espoused by Muensterberg and his colleagues could not deal with "the infinite variation of idiosyncrasy"'M4 presented by real witnesses in actual courtroom
proceedings. In sum, the "new" ideas were either known to the
legal profession already or were so vague as to be worthless.
Turning his attention to the quality of the research itself,
Wigmore pointed out that it was the product of experimental
settings wildly different from the courtroom and that its legal
applicability was open to serious question.55 Beyond this, Wigmore demonstrated that there was substantial disagreement
among psychologists about many of the propositions set forth in
On the Witness Stand.56 Finally, Wigmore emphasized that the
material used by Muensterberg had never been verified by ex49. Id- at 63-69.
50. Id- at 73-110.

51. John H. Wigmore, ProfessorMuensterberg and the Psychology of Testimony, 3 Nw. U. L. REv. 399, 417 (1909).
52. Id at 417-20.
53. Id at 420-21.
54. 1d at 421.
55. Id. at 424-25.
56. Id. at 425-26.
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periments using different methodologies.5 7
Wigmore succeeded in painting Muensterberg as an imprudent and hasty reformer whose data were not reliable and
whose methods were open to question. To survive such rigorous scrutiny requires a far more effective research program
than that undertaken by Muensterberg and his colleagues. In
outline, such a program should have at least the following three
characteristics: critical studies should be demonstrably valid in
internal design and external applicability, the resulting data
and conclusions should be subjected to searching and effective
review, and the most important results should be replicated by
studies using a variety of methodologies. While these research
criteria have been discussed in other settings, 58 it is useful to
review their implications in the hearsay context. As a preliminary matter it should be noted that jury proceedings are, by
law, confidential. 59 Therefore, researchers will generally have
to rely on simulations if they wish to scrutinize the nature of
juror deliberations regarding hearsay. Reliance on simulation
techniques has a number of important implications. These will
be explored in the next section along with other, more general,
methodological issues.
1.

Research Validity.

Research validity is an important concern of social scientists working on legal questions. In a recent article, John
Monahan and Laurens Walker sought to outline what social science findings deserve to be treated as authoritative. 60 Monahan
and Walker argued that the key to internal validity is controlling for "competing hypotheses that may account for an observed state of affairs."''S Although there are a range of
internal validity problems, 62 two are likely to be particularly
57. Id, at 426-27.
58. See generally Symposium, Simulation Research and the Law, 3 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1979) (articles discussing research methodology in simulating
legal phenomena).
59. Jury secrecy has been protected both by judicial decision and legislative enactment. See, e.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (1953); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1508 (1988); CAL. PENAL CODE § 167 (West 1988).
60. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,
Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477
(1986).
61. Id at 502.
62. See DONALD T. CAMPBELL & JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 5-6, 13-22, (1963) (detailed discussion of internal validity problems); see also-Richard Lempert, Strategies of
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prominent in evidence simulations. The first is the possibility
that a confounding factor will be inadvertently inserted into
the stimulus materials. The second is that evaluative instruments will call undue attention to the items being tested.
When the target of research is a particular method of delivering evidence, for example hearsay, or a single substantive category of proof, for example the fact that one of the parties has
a criminal record, it is extremely difficult to ensure that alternative motivations do not cloud juror reactions to the evidentiary item being tested. The source presenting the critical
material, whether it is a witness or a document, may improperly affect the outcome as, for example, when a witness of unexpectedly high or low credibility is used.6 3 Alternatively, the
form of the targeted evidence, that is, the length or method of
delivery, may stimulate an inappropriately intense response
from jurors. Finally, the uniqueness of the material may provoke inappropriate scrutiny and defeat the experimental objective of assessing how jurors in trial conditions react to
unhighlighted evidence of a defined sort.
The second particularly thorny internal validity problem in
evidentiary simulations is designing sensitive evaluative techniques, such as questionnaires, that do not call special attention
to the targeted evidence but allow assessment of jurors' reactions to it. This problem is especially serious if the experimenters seek to assess individual juror attitudes before the same
jurors join in group deliberations.6
These two problems may be even more serious if one presently popular theory about the way jurors decide cases is correct. The "Story Model" suggests that jurors decide cases by
creating stories that draw on patterns or schemas that they
have previously established. Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie describe the Story Model in the following way:
[Tihe story is established by inferring events not included in the testimony from frames of world knowledge matching events already esResearch Design in the Legal Impact Study: The Control of Plausible Rival

Hypotheses, 1 LAw & Soc'y REv. 111 (1966).
63. See LIPPA, supra note 14, at 258.
64. See Richard 0. Lempert, Uncovering 'Nondiscernible' Differences:
EmpiricalResearch and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MIcH. L. REv. 643, 703 (1975)
(suggesting that obtaining written commitments from individual jurors before
they deliberate may "affect the extent to which [they] are influenced by

groups" and citing Harold B. Gerard, Deviation, Conformity, and Commitment, in CURRENT STuDIEs IN SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY 263, 266-67 (Ivan D. Steiner

& Martin Fishbein eds., 1965)).
65. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 29, at 243-45.
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tablished. Inferences are evaluated by simulating one's own behavior
in similar situations, by checking for contradictions with other plausible conclusions and by checking for inconsistencies with other plausible conclusions and by checking for inconsistencies with the current
form of the story.66

If this model is accurate, jurors do not really focus on individual pieces of evidence but instead try to fashion all the evidence
into a single plot. They filter out or assign substantially reduced significance to things that do not fit. This theory implies
that individual items of evidence are generally of little intrinsic
importance to jurors and that teasing out their effects will depend on exactly how they are related to larger currents in juror
thinking. In order to stir any reaction, the targeted evidence
may have to have substantial relevance to preexisting juror
schemas. Of course, identifying such evidence may prove difficult. Its use may attract undesired attention to the experimental manipulation or become confounded with the appeal of the
underlying story.
External validity problems may also prove serious in evidence simulations. Wayne Weiten and Shari Diamond have
carefully analyzed the sorts of difficulties experimenters may
face when using simulations in this type of applied research.6 7
They suggest six problems of particular concern: inadequate
sampling, inadequate trial simulation, lack of jury deliberation,
inappropriate dependent variables, lack of corroborative field
data, and disparity of motivation between real and simulated
jurors.68

As Weiten and Diamond point out, experimenters should
take care in selecting their subject sample. Although students
are generally easy to use as subjects, they have a variety of attitudes and attributes that differ from those of the general public. Therefore, it is best to conduct applied research simulations
with subjects drawn from the wider community.6 9 This advice
seems to make as much sense in the hearsay area as elsewhere,
but it should not be construed as a flat ban on student-focused
research. Student subjects may prove extremely useful in preliminary experiments, especially because they help keep costs
66. Id at 254.
67. Researchers will generally conduct such simulations without specific
theoretical objectives and, therefore, they should be classified as applied research. See Weiten & Diamond, supra note 16, at 75.
68. Id- at 75-83.
69. Id- at 75-77.
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to a minimum while researchers develop their techniques and
materials.
The evidentiary simulations utilized in hearsay research
should be as much like real trials as possible. Stripped-down
simulations like the once-popular 400-word summary are likely
to produce misleadingly exaggerated results.70 The key in hearsay and other evidence work is determining "whether... manipulations would be effective if embedded in the vastly greater
flow of information more typical of an actual trial. ' 71 Whether
the stimulus materials are presented in writing or by a means
more closely approximating the trial experience, such as videotape, is also important. Written materials may be appropriate
for a beginning inquiry, especially because of the substantial
costs associated with videotaped presentations. However, because hearsay usually consists of one witness repeating the outof-court words of another, a body of experimentation that failed
to test juror-subjects' reactions to oral hearsay would be incomplete.72 The best approach may be to begin with written experiments and then proceed to videotaped replications as
promising trends and effective experimental vehicles are
discovered.
Weiten and Diamond urge experimenters to use group de73
liberations rather than rely on the reports of single jurors.
They hasten to point out, however, that "[i]ndividual prediscussion positions are important determinants of the deliberation
proceedings and are certainly related to the final verdict." 74
For this reason, preliminary research may rely upon individual
juror evaluations. Definitive results, however, must incorporate group deliberations. Such assessments will require very
large sample populations in order to create a set of data powerful enough to warrant reform proposals. An interesting additional question is whether researchers ought to monitor and
analyze the deliberations themselves to trace the precise effects
of the targeted evidentiary material. This sort of scrutiny has
70. Id at 77.
71. Id However, as in testing for potential carcinogens, there may be
some utility in initially examining extreme situations that can be manufactured only in the laboratory.
72. See id at 77 (noting that a change in the mode of information input,
such as reading as opposed to listening, deprives the simulated juror of a
source of information available to real jurors, who pay attention to the nonverbal behavior of trial participants).
73. Id at 78-79.
74. Id at 79.
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been advocated in cognate areas such as jury size research. 75 It
seems warranted for hearsay research so long as there are sufficient resources to sustain the elaborate and labor-intensive
effort.
Two other concerns are the use of appropriate dependent
variables and the pursuit of corroborative field data.76 With respect to dependent variables, jurors generally should be asked
to give a guilty/not guilty7 7 verdict rather than a less realistic

decision. Of course, verdicts are not particularly well focused
on the target evidentiary material, but supplementary questionnaires can provide more precise data. As discussed above, the
questionnaires must be carefully designed to minimize any
skewing of juror thinking or deliberation. On the issue of real
world corroboration, experimenters should explore as many
methodologies as possible in order to get a sense of the effect of
specific evidentiary rules in real trials. This is likely to be an
extremely complex task in light of the huge volume and wide
range of materials produced at trials. The gathering of judicial
reports or evaluations like those solicited by Harry Kalven and
Hans Zeisel for The American Jury may be helpful. 7s Alternatively, experimenters may attempt to collect post-verdict assess79
ments from jurors.
The final problem highlighted by Weiten and Diamond is
the potential disparity of motivation between real jurors and
those simply playing the juror role in a simulation. 0 This is
the most troublesome of the six external validity problems because it is virtually impossible to solve in a simulation.8 ' In
light of the legally enforced secrecy that shrouds real jury deliberations, there may be no alternative to relying on simula75. See Lempert, supra note 64, at 702 (noting that the ability to monitor
jury deliberation processes is an advantage of using mock juries).

76. See Weiten & Diamond, supra note 16, at 79-81.
77. This should not be taken as implying that only criminal cases are appropriate for experimentation.
78. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 33-54

(1966).
79. A number of commentators have pointed out the questionable value of
such data. See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 64.
80. Weiten & Diamond, supra note 16, at 81-83. Actual jurors display a
range of motivation, as was well demonstrated by the Public Broadcasting System's Frontline videotape of actual jury deliberations that was aired on April
8, 1986. See Margaret E. Guthrie, Film Takes an Inside Look at Deliberations
of Jurors, NAT'L L.J., April 14, 1986, at 8.
81. It might be possible to arrange a simulation in which the subjects are
tricked into believing that their decision has actual significance, but the ethical
questions posed by such deception are substantial.
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tions. Risk of distortion due to role-playing may decline,
however, as verisimilitude is heightened, providing an extra incentive for attention to jury composition, simulation realism,
and group deliberations.
2.

The Need for Effective Review

Individual investigators must consider the foregoing methodological principles, but social scientists as a body must participate if hearsay research, or any other evidentiary inquiry, is to
establish its persuasiveness. Monahan and Walker have urged
that claims to social science authority be judged, at least in
part, by various forms of peer review. 2 These include refereed
journals, federal funding panels, and task forces asked to assess
the value of specific bodies of data.8 3 Researchers should subject hearsay and evidence research to all of these processes.
More important, a working group, perhaps under the aegis of
the Association of American Law Schools or Division 41 of the
American Psychological Association, ought to be formed to facilitate the review process and serve as a clearinghouse for the
research effort. Conferences similar to the Minnesota Hearsay
Reform Symposium ought to be held regularly and their results
published so that scholars can collectively consider refinements
in research methods and questions raised by research data.
3.

Replication of Results

The ultimate goal of hearsay rule research is to produce a
substantial body of experiments that use different methodologies and replicate one another's findings.84 Such a body of research would create a strong basis for evaluating the propriety
of reform. Monahan and Walker stress this point and compare
it to the respect a court's decision receives when it is followed
by a substantial number of other courts.8 5
Even if such a foundation were established, caution would
still be warranted. Writing in 1979, Vladimir Konecni and Ebbe
Ebbesen described a set of experiments in which they used six
82. Monahan & Walker, supra note 60, at 500.

83. I& at 500-01.
84. See CAMPBELL & STANLEY, supra note 62, at 3 (describing 12 factors
jeopardizing the validity of various experimental designs).
85. Monahan & Walker, supra note 60, at 507-08; see also William Gardner
et al., Asserting Scientific Authority, 1989 Am. PSYCHOL. 895, 899 (1989) (advocating the use of a variety of methodologies and replication of findings to substantiate the difference between adults' and adolescents' decisions on whether

to have an abortion).
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different methods to assess the nature of the sentencing process
in criminal courts. These ranged from "journalistic" interviews
and experimental simulations to archival analysis.s8 They determined that, at least as to sentencing, different methods did
not produce uniformity of findings, and that one method, archival analysis, seemed far more reliable than others.8 7 Indeed,
partial agreement between other methods appeared to distort
the real nature of the process.8 8 Consequently, Kone6ni and
Ebbesen argued that the multiple method principle must be
qualified "when one studies an intact functioning social network-such as the criminal justice system. '8 9 They stressed
the need for archival analysis of real world decisions.9 Still,
the appropriate sorts of real world data are virtually impossible
to obtain in the evidence context. In such situations, Kone~ni
and Ebbesen urged: "[R]ather than automatically assume that
simulations are useful, one ought to collect sufficient evidence
to test whether they have captured the necessary details of the
real world to be real simulations."91
There has not yet been enough hearsay research to warrant a discussion of reform on empirical grounds. Before entertaining reform proposals, we must be satisfied that we have
fashioned "real simulations" that cover the critical aspects of
the hearsay rule. The research described above addresses only
one facet of the rule, juror incompetence. Although it may
take only a modest showing to discredit such a judicial hypothesis, 92 doing so does not satisfy the need for empirical research.

It remains necessary to address other concerns associated with
the hearsay concept, including the appearance of fairness, the
use of cross-examination, and perhaps even the maintenance of
an adversarial approach to adjudication.
86.

Kone~ni & Ebbesen, supra note 17, at 46.

87. Id at 62-64.
88. [L]iterally all methods indicated that the severity of the crime
and the offender's prior criminal record are highly important. If all
of our studies, except for the archival analysis, had been carried out,
the conclusion about the major importance of these two variables in
the sentencing process would presumably have been made with a
great deal of confidence, due to the fact that it would have been based
on the results which represent a point of convergence of many quite
different methods. Yet, such a conclusion would be entirely wrong.
Id at 64 (citation omitted).
89. Id at 64-65.
90. Id at 65-66. Real world data, however, lack the internal validity of
laboratory results and thus present their own problems.
91. Id at 68.
92. See Gardner et al., supra note 85, at 900.
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C. THE RISK OF REFORM
To urge reform without the broadest sort of research program is both dangerous and foolhardy-dangerous because injurious reforms may be adopted and foolhardy because
substantial, justified criticism may be leveled at those who prematurely call for restructuring. At the request of the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the
Federal Judicial Center, a panel was established in 1978 "to
identify, define, analyze, and recommend resolution of issues
bearing on the propriety, value and effectiveness of controlled
experimentation for evaluating innovations in the justice system. ' 93 Although this group's main concern was experimentation involving actual litigants, its report provided criteria useful
for assessing when reform ought to be considered. The Committee's report stressed the need to be cognizant of the ethical
obligation owed to those affected by proposed innovations.9
The report stated that "uncertainties regarding either the risks
of adverse consequences or the possibility that the innovation
will be ineffective" make it essential that careful and ethically
sensitive experimental work be carried out before major
changes are made. 95
In the hearsay setting, following this principle militates

against hasty reform. Nothing should be done until experimental work reveals that the admission of hearsay poses little
threat to the actual or perceived integrity of jury deliberation.
Testing should not stop when these propositions are established; researchers should assess the efficacy of any new mechanism proposed to deal with hearsay, whether it be a blanket
rule of admission, reliance on judicial discretion, or something
else. It is crucial to determine not only how any replacement
rule would work, but also whether it would unacceptably discourage the production of live witnesses or pose other risks.
Reform has never been approached this carefully. In fact,
courts and legislatures have frequently acted on the basis of the
most unreliable data. Such a methodology can yield damaging
results. The best example of the pitfalls of a careless and hasty
approach is the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Flor93. EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW: REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER ADVISORY CommITTEE ON ExPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW at v (Federal
Judicial Center 1981).

94. IL at 7.
95.

Id at 2.
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ida 96 and its aftermath. In Williams, the Court permitted a reduction in the size of the jury from twelve to six. 97 While it

was not incumbent on the Court to adduce any empirical support for its willingness to overthrow hundreds of years of legal
tradition, the Court went out of its way to find scientific endorsement. 98 Unfortunately, the Court embraced the few available studies without scrutinizing their internal or external
validity. It did not search for a real confluence of findings but
rather twisted what few data there were to meet its objectives.
It did not seek data about the likely consequences of the reform
it was adopting. Predictably, subsequent commentary made it
clear that the Court's empirical basis for its change was absolutely unconvincing,99 that studies cited by the Court were
grievously flawed,' °° that the change exposed the system to
greater jury unpredictability 0 ' and that it undermined the
jury's ability to represent minority points of view. 0 2 Eventually, the Court retreated from the logic of its own reform, and
in Ballew v. Georgia 0 3 implicitly turned its back on the jury
studies it had been so keen to utilize just eight years before.
The Court did not acknowledge, however, that the very basis of
its original decision in Williams was invalid. The Supreme
Court's hasty and ill-supported action has resulted in substantial and lasting damage to the jury process.' °4
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
The assumptions underlying social science research make it
virtually impossible to prove that admitting hearsay testimony
into evidence will never alter the outcome of a trial in a way
that will concern the legal community. 0 5 Research can demon96.

399 U.S. 78 (1970).

97. Id at 103.
98. Id at 101.
99. See MICHAEL J. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS 911 (1977); Hans Zeisel & Shari
S. Diamond, 'ConvincingEmpiricalEvidence' on the Six Member Jury, 41 U.
CHI. L. REV. 281, 282-90 (1974); see also Lempert, supra note 64, at 684-89, 698
(discussing research that supports arguments for 12-person juries).
100. See Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 99, at 282-90.
101. Id. at 294.
102. See Lempert, supra note 64, at 668-81.
103. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
104. Evidence from Los Angeles courts confirms that using smaller juries
does exclude minority points of view. See G. Thomas Munsterman et al., A
Comparison of the Performance of Eight- and Twelve-Person Juries 35 (1990)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
105. See JOHN M. NEALE & ROBERT M. LIEBERT, SCIENCE AND BEHAVIOR:
AN INTRODUCTION TO METHODS OF RESEARCH 94 (3d ed. 1986).
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strate only that admitting hearsay into evidence does or does
not make a difference in the settings created in particular experiments. This means that research of the sort described in
this Article will never provide the definitive answer to all questions about the hearsay rule. Researchers will be able to do no
more than pursue those questions which seem most lively or
pressing. Even such a limited project will be complex, expensive, and beyond the resources of any single laboratory. Nevertheless, the research necessary for a satisfying empirical
understanding of hearsay is not beyond our reach.
One basic concern must be the method of presenting the
hearsay to subjects. The oral and visual impact of hearsay evidence investigated in studies must be representative of the impact of hearsay in courtroom situations. This will require more
use of videotaped materials of the sort used in the experiments
06
conducted by Peter Meine and his associates.
A second issue involves the quantity of hearsay evidence
that jurors can successfully process. Our materials presented a
single statement embedded in a relatively long trial; those of
Meine et al. appear to do the same. 0 7 However, Schuller introduced at least four pieces of hearsay evidence, two describing
factual occurrences and two attesting to the defendant's state of
mind at the time of the crime. Still, she found that the hearsay
had no effect on verdicts. 0 8 Further research ought to be pursued to determine how large a ratio of hearsay to nonhearsay
statements jurors are able to handle effectively.
A third issue relates to the factual context in which the
hearsay testimony is set. Does the type of case matter? This is
a reasonable possibility since, for example, the impact of prior
convictions' 0 9 and jury nullification instructions" 0 are
powerfully altered by the nature or severity of the crime being
prosecuted. Does the substance of the hearsay testimony itself
change its impact? For example, would jurors judge a witness's
106.

Meine et al., supra note 11, at 4.

107. Id.
108. Schuller, supra note 13, at 17.
109. Cornish & Sealy, supra note 1, at 222 (noting that the admission of
previous convictions increases the likelihood of a guilty verdict but only if the
convictions are for offenses similar to the offense charged); Wissler & Saks,
supra note 1, at 43-47.
110. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Thomas E. Willging, ChangingViews of Jury
Power The Nullification Debate, 1787-1988,15 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 165, 17274 (1991); Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullifwation: The Impact of JudicialInstructions, Arguments, and Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 439, 450-52 (1988).
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second-hand description of what someone said he or she did differently than they would a witness's hearsay about what someone else said he or she saw? Does the inculpatory or
exculpatory nature of the hearsay alter its effect on jurors?
Schuller's findings begin to speak to this point,11 1 but many
questions remain. Similarly, whether the timing or placement
of the hearsay within the trial sequence affects verdicts is an
important question. Hearsay offered early in a trial, when jurors are just beginning to construct their story, might be more
of a threat to the integrity of the process. 1 2 Finally, the effect
of factors such as the length, complexity, and overall strength
of a case on the evaluation of hearsay testimony deserve to be
1 13
assessed.

A fourth issue inevitably raised in research on jury
processes is how jurors handle hearsay in group deliberations.

Evidence from actual observation of deliberations, 114 mock juror deliberations, 115 and memoirs of juror experiences" 6 all
suggest that the majority of jurors take their task seriously and
weigh the evidence carefully. Despite this evidence, are there
particular circumstances under which jurors would misuse
hearsay testimony? For example, do jurors misuse hearsay
when the evidence is less carefully weighed, as in the cases of
juries that are "verdict-driven"1 1 7 or operating under a majority
decision rule?" 8 Instructions to disregard testimony may be
important if research demonstrates that hearsay influences juror decisions under some circumstances. Is the instruction to
"disregard" effective? Mock jurors in our experiment and in
Schuller's study" 9 reported that they complied with this instruction, but such self reports do not necessarily signal actual
compliance. In fact, data on such instructions 2 0 as well as so111. Schuller, supra note 13, at 13-18.
112. C. LoH, supra note 15, at 488-92 (noting the effect of order of communication on opinion change); Robert G. Lawson, The Law of Primacy in the
Criminal Courtroom, 77 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 121, 123-26 (1969) (discussing how
the order of criminal proceedings affects the outcome of jury verdicts).
113. The authors found no interaction between overall strength of case and
hearsay testimony. Landsman & Rakos, supra note 12, at 76.
114.

See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 78, at 482-91; Guthrie, supra note

80.
115.
116.

See REID HASTi ET AL., INSIDE THE JuRY 230 (1983).
See, e.g., MELVYN B. ZERMAN, CALL THE FINAL WrrNEss (1977)

(memoirs of a juror at a murder trial).
117.
118.

See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 115.
Id at 228-29; see KALVEN & ZEIsEL, supra note 78, at 461.

119. Schuller, supra note 13, at 15.
120. See id
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cial psychological theory' 2 1 suggest that compliance is not so
easily achieved. As an alternative, would a "cautionary" instruction urging close scrutiny of the questioned evidence better serve desired goals?' 2 Or do all types of instructions
highlight and thereby increase the undesired effect of hearsay?
This is a possibility strongly suggested by other research on
3
limiting instructions.=
Is blanket admission the best remedy for the hearsay problem? Assuming it is, several procedural questions arise. First,
can voir dire procedures be developed to identify jurors unable
to weigh the second-hand nature of hearsay competently? If
such strategies were available, particularly vulnerable jurors
might be eliminated from the panel. Second, can cross-examination of hearsay witnesses produce results comparable to
cross-examination of witnesses with identical admissible testimony? In other words, if the hearsay is "shaky," can cross-examination of a sponsoring witness= 4 expose its weaknesses in a
manner similar to that achieved by cross-examination of other
questionable testimony?
These issues and questions are all products of an inductive
approach to the topic. In closing, we should mention that an alternative, deductive strategy might stimulate a different range
of research questions and designs. A detailed discussion of a
deductive approach is beyond the scope of this Article, but a
provocative possibility is offered by Richard Petty and John
Cacioppo's dual route theory of central and peripheral persuasion.125 This theory asserts that the central route of decision
121. Lisa Eichhorn, Social Science Findings and the Jury's Ability to Disregard Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 341, 344-50 (1989).
122. Schuller, supra note 13, at 17 n.6, tested this and found that mock jurors receiving a cautionary instruction reported more use of the hearsay evidence than those receiving a disregard instruction; nevertheless, the type of

limiting instruction did not affect the verdicts.
123. Id. at 13-18.
124. Cross-examination requires the availability of such a witness and his
or her preparation to speak about the origins of the hearsay evidence. For a
proposal mandating the production of such witnesses, see Swift, supra note 33,
at 1358-61, 1378-83.
125. RIcHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, COMMUNIcATION AND PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE (1986);
Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, Involvement and Persuasio. Tradition
Versus Integration,107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 367 (1990) (responding to a critique by
Blair T. Johnson and Alice H. Eagly, Effects of Involvement on Persuasion:A
Meta-Analysis, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 290, 290-314 (1989), of the effects of involvement on persuasion).
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making is employed by involved listeners who analyze and then
26
logically evaluate the contents of the messages they receive.
Such listeners are said to undertake comprehensive scrutiny of
the issue-relevant arguments presented by the source, while
avoiding distractions such as irrelevant features of the source,
the way the information is packaged, or their affective responses to that information.127 Cognitive skills and motivation
are necessary for effective utilization of the central route.12S
When these attributes are absent, decision makers are likely to
rely on the peripheral route, in which superficial characteristics
assume greater importance and critical analysis is neglected.'29
The theory implies that hearsay statements will be of greatest
concern when jurors fail to employ the central route in an effective manner. Furthermore, it offers hypotheses concerning
the conditions under which decision makers are likely to increase the use of each of the persuasion routes, such as prior
knowledge, existing opinion, forewarning of content, and persuasive intent. These are variables that are obviously relevant
to, and could be tested within, the hearsay context. Clearly, a
hearsay research program that is based in theory is likely to
generate hypotheses and experimental designs that produce
very different but substantially useful data.

126.

PErry & CACIOPPO, supra note 125, at 11.

127. Id
128. Id at 20.
129. Id at 11, 141-72; see also id. at
peripheral cues).

204-15

(discussing variables that serve as

